and Harling v. United Stales At the third trial the testimony Harrison had given at the second trial was introduced into evidence over counsel's objection, but Harrison did not testify. 8 He was again convicted. 9 In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that since Harrison's decision to testify in the earlier trial was a volitional exercise of an individual human personality, the testimony was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegality and hence admissible at the subsequent trial. ° The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that testimony impelled by the admission of a wrongfully obtained confession was inadmissible. n 7295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961) This case rendered inadmissible at a criminal trial statements made by a juvenile before juvenile court waived jurisdiction over him. In the District of Columbia, juvenile court has original jurisdiction in cases where a person under twenty one is accused of having violated a law at the time he was under eighteen. D.C. Con §11- 1551 (1967) , formerly Act of June 1, 1938, ch. 309 §6(b) , 52 Stat. 596. Juvenile court may waive jurisdiction in cases where the offense would be punishable by death if committed by an adult. D.C. CODE §11-1553 (1967) , formerly Act of June 1, 1938, ch. 309 §13, 52 Stat. 599. Harrison was under eighteen at the time of the shooting, but was eighteen at the time of his arrest. The confessions were made a week before juvenile court waived jurisdiction over the case. 359 F.2d at 223.
There was a natural presumption, the Court stated, that Harrison would not have made such a damaging admission but for the admission of the confessions into evidence. The prosecution had the burden of proving this presumption false, and it did not do so 2 Justices Harlan, Black, and White dissented.
3
The basic issue in the case is whether testimony given by defendant in an attempt to overcome the effects of an illegally obtained confession should have been excluded from a subsequent trial 14 under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 1 There was a distinct claim that Harrison was compelled to testify against himself by the introduction of the unlawfully obtained confession. The courts have used language indicating that the privilege against self-incrimination is violated when the state penalizes a person for remaining silent. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964) . But even though Harrison was in fact compelled to testify-if he did not, the jury would make its decision with an unrebutted confession before it-the Court was unwilling to find a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Since, as Justice White notes, 392 U.S. at 229-30 (dissent), compulsion will exist whether or not the evidence was lawfully obtained, allowing a Fifth Amendment claim would logically exclude all evidence harmful to defendant since he would be compelled to answer it. However, even though the Court does not recognize the harmful effects of the confessions as creating compulsion in the Fifth Amendment sense, it does recognize them as a kind of compulsion which forms the causal link between the police illegality and the testimony necessary for exclusion under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
15 The doctrine is also known as taint, and as the derivative evidence rule. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,341 (1939) . the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude testimony which was "impelled by the erroneous admission of illegally obtained evidence". 600,603 (1967) . See also People v. Stockman, 63 Cal. 2d 494,502, 47 Cal. Rptr. 365,369-70, 407 P.2d 277,281-82 (1965); People v. Nye, 63 Cal. 2d 166,175-76, 45 Cal. Rptr. 328,334-35, 403 P.2d 736, 742-43 (1965); People v. Davis, 62 Cal. 2d 791, 796, 44 Cal. Rptr. 454,457, 402 P.2d 142,145 (1965) . California case law on the exclusionary rule has influenced the Supreme Court before. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,445, 282 P.2d 905,911 (1955 ) quoted in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,651-2 (1961 .
18 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Police illegally seized and photographed certain ledgers, then used the photographs to obtain a search warrant for the ledgers. The court excluded the ledgers.
19308 U.S. 338 (1939). The Court gave defendant the right to inqulre into the uses which the prosecution had made of an illegal wiretap.
20371 U.S. 471,485-87 (1963) . For relevant facts see text accompanying notes 29 and 30 infra.
21justice White, the principal dissenter, believes that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct; the possibility that a confession would lead to incriminating testimony by defendant is too remote to influence the police one way or another. 392 U.S. at 231-2 (dissent). The Court of Appeals felt that the decision to testify was a volitional act of an individual human personality and therefor the testimony should have been admitted under the doctrine of attenuation. 387 F.2d at 210. These views are discussed below.
22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 26The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is one test which is applied to evidence to determine admissibility. Another is standing of the defendant to object to the evidence. See Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471 (1952) . A third is whether the purpose of the evidence will be to impeach testimony or to prove guilt. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954) ; but see Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 175-80 (9th Cir. 1968) . For a discussion of this area, see Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea far Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136 REv. (1967 .
"251 U.S. 385,392 (1920) : "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others... " 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) . "We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary location of hidden narcotics, which police then seized. These were also excluded as fruit of the search and arrest.
0
Harrison does not fit clearly into either type, although it resembles the cases in which police follow up on information learned during the illegal act. The major distinction is the lack of police involvement with the testimony. The confession was exploited, not by the police, but by the prosecution which introduced the rebuttal testimony at the third trial. Moreover, Harrison made his decision to testify on his own, insulated from the presence of police and prosecution by the protections of court and counsel. But the Supreme Court was not bothered by this distinction. None of its cases suggested that only police were prohibited from exploiting illegally obtained evidence. And even if neither police nor prosecution were in Harrison's immediate presence when he made his decision to testify, the prosecution had made the decision necessary by confronting him with the devastating effects of an illegally obtained confession. 21 Thus the state was as causally involved in the procurement of the rebuttal testimony as it is when police utilize unlawfully obtained evidence and, by investigation, discover other evidence.
However, Silverthorne and Wong Sun also indicate that evidence is admissible if it is derived from an independent source," or if it is obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable [from the illegality]".
3 This reasoning is used in cases where police had access to both lawfully and unlawfully 0 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) . This would logically have fit under either the use or exploitation principles. The Court did not cite the use principle here, but instead announced the exploitation principle. This consideration and that in note 29 supra make it appear that the Wong Sun Court saw no distinction between the two principles. 66 Cal. 2d 158, 163-69, 57 Cal. Rptr. 163,169-71, 424 P.2d 715,721-23 (1967); People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716,728-30, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193,201-2, 401 P.2d 665, 673-74 (1965) . Confessions have special prejudicial effects since both defendant and jury are likely to regard them as conclusive evidence of guilt. The psychological effects on a defendant are particularly important since the exclusionary rule operates by having criminals police the police by taking the initiative and objecting to evidence. A criminal will not act as a "private attorney general" if, because he had confessed, he decides his conviction is assured. He will probably choose to seek mercy and not antagonize anyone by objecting to evidence. Thus it can be argues that a higher degree of exclusion is needed to counteract the effects of confessions.
251 U.S. 385,392 (1920) . 371 U.S. 471,487-88 (1963).
[Vol. 60 obtained information. For example, in Harlow v. United States-police, by lawful use of an informer and by unlawful search of defendant's mail, learned that a certain individual was participating in a bribery ring. This individual confessed during interrogation and implicated the defendant. As a result, a search warrant was issued and the mail, which police had previously opened unlawfully, was seized and introduced into evidence. The conviction was affirmed on the grounds that the knowledge was obtained through an independent source. Such cases are difficult and must be resolved by speculating what would have happened had there been no unlawful act and evaluating such speculation in terms of who bears the burden of proof.
35
Evidence is also admissible under Nardone v. United States where "as a matter of good sense" the causal connection between the evidence and the illegality "is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint". 6 The attenuation doctrine is difficult to apply, since it says very little on its face. The language of Nardone suggests that it is designed to prevent extreme results, as measured by the intricacy of the argument claiming a causal connectionY 7 As a practical matter it may merely give a court a reason not to exclude evidence when it doesn't want to. 3 3 The Court of Appeals held Harrison's testimony admissible, relying on decisions which held that the causal connection is sufficiently attenuated when police learn the identity of a prosecution witness as a result of an illegal act. 39 The rationale behind these "tainted witness" cases depends on distinctions between the testimony of a witness and physical evidence. A witness might come forward voluntarily if he were not discovered; physical evidence could not. 40 A witness has control over his testimony, while physical evidence speaks for itself.a' Thus in "an individual human personality ... elements of will, perception, memory and volition interact" 42 in such a way that it may be uncertain that the police illegality caused the testimony of the "tainted witness"A' The "tainted witness" cases should not apply to Harrison." There are significant differences between a prosecution witness whose identity was discovered through police illegality and a defendant who took the stand to rebut wrongfully obtained evidence. Harrison was facing the death penalty 45 and was protected by the privilege against selfincrimination. It is dearly unreasonable to believe that he would have come forth voluntarily and admitted so much had the confessions not been introduced. The causal connection between the confessions and the testimony is very dear. Will, perception, memory and volition are only relevant as they provide meaningful alternatives in the causal chain, not as mystical qualities which in themselves invoke the doctrine of attenuation. Thus the fact that Harrison made a tactical decision to testify on the advice of counsel should not be conclusive." Volition, reflection and advice of counsel are irrelevant, since they could not have helped to counteract the effects of the confessions.
0
The government should not escape by claiming that Harrison made a voluntary act, when that act was in fact necessitated by the introduction of the confessions." Nor should it escape because the decision was made as a matter of trial tactics. 9 (2d Cir. 1964) (witness pressured by police, inadmissible). This may make some sense in terms of causation in fact but, evidentiary problems aside, the disposition of the witness when the police arrive seems to be pure chance, unrelated to any policy behind the exclusionary 49 The harmful effects that police illegality can have on defendant's trial tactics have not been ignored. The facts of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,91 (1963) , are not unlike those in Harrison in that there evidence illegally seized and confessions induced by the seizure were introduced, and defendants took the stand in the hope of mitigating them. The Court recognized the limitations this placed on their case as an example of the prejudice caused by the admission of the evidence, but did not rule on the testimony itself. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218,240-41 (1967) . There the Court recognized the harm done to defendant's case if counsel had to dwell on lineup identifications by prosecution witnesses in the hope of finding some illegality.
Thus the Court of Appeals decision appears erroneously based. The proper result of the case and the proper scope of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should be determined by considering the policies behind the exclusionary rule'L--deterrence of police misconduct and preservation of the moral force of the law.
5 2 To deter police misconduct effectively, the courts must consider the psychology of the policeman. Presumably the police will be less 5 The Court of Appeals also held "[ilt would be rash to assume that defendants.., would be induced to testify favorably to the Government by either the introduction of the prior confessions or their procurement three years previously." 387 F.2d at 210. The Court ignored the fact that testimony is favorable or unfavorable relative to the evidence already before the court. Thus Harrison's testimony admitting the shooting but denying the robbery attempt was favorable to him in the presence of the confession admitting both the shooting and the robbery attempt. It was unfavorable to him at the third trial where there was little other evidence connecting him with the shooting. 387 F.2d at 210-12.
" Theoretically the doctrine should cease to be applied at the point of diminishing returns where the social cost in terms of police illegality which could have been deterred and public respect for the law which could have been preserved is outweighed by the social cost of releasing criminals instead of jailing them. See Comment, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria. 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136 REv. , 1140 REv. (1967 . This paper will not attempt to measure such social cost. Instead it will assume that any sub stantial deterrence of police illegality or furtherance of the integrity of the law will outweigh whatever harm may be done by releasing Harrison and any others similarly situated. This assumption seems reasonable in view of the willingness of courts to exclude evidence in the past and the limited scope of Harrison in comparison with other decisions such as Miranda. Justice White agrees with this approach in his dissent, although not with the result. He says that the only purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter the police and that exclusion in Harrison does not substantially deter the police because they will not foresee the use of the confession. 392 U.S. at 231-2. Of course one determines how much deterrence is substantial by evaluating the social costs mentioned above. This is probably a matter of individual point of view and more empirical 1,55 (1967) , which held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to juvenile court proceedings. [Vol. 60 likely to act illegally if the evidence obtained can not be used in court. But it is not conclusive to note, as Justice White does, that the police who detained Harrison could not have forseen that incriminating testimony would result.0 Exceptions to the exclusionary rule may defeat the rule by encouraging the police to act illegally in the hopi that a conviction will result, even if some evidence may be excluded.-The policeman, in deciding whether to act legally or illegally, may be motivated by emotional zeal as well as by the desire to obtain a conviction. He may also evaluate the alternative benefits of harassment as a means of controlling criminals,"1 as well as the likelihood of getting a conviction if the rules are observed. In the latter sense, it is possible that too many exclusionary rules will deter the police from trying to get convictions at all and encourage them to adopt harassment as an alternative policy. Thus, as the courts have admitted, any attempt to predict the effect that exclusion in a particular set of circumstances will have on police conduct may be speculation.
6
The policy of preserving the moral force of the law is dearer. The state's law enforcement machinery should act as adversary to the criminal in such a way as will earn the respect of the public.
7 As such it should-not benefit from its own wrongdoing,"3 especially consciously or deliberately. In the language of Wong Sun v. United States, it should not exploit illegality. 59 If it attempts to do so the judge must preserve the moral force of the law by negating any benefit which it may have received.
60 Even though it may be impossible to put defendant and prosecution in the position they would have been had the police acted lawfully," E8 392 U.S. at 231-32 (dissent). "People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757,766-67, 44 Cal. Rptr. 313, 318-19, 401 P.2d 921, 926-7, (1965 S. 206,218 (1960) . For empirical attempts to deal with the problem, see note 51 supra.
""The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law." Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAav. L. Rav. 1,26 (1956) quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,480 (1966) . "People v. Bilderbach, 62 Cal. 2d 757,763, 44 Cal. Rptr. 313,316, 401 P.2d 921,924 (1965) . 69 371 U.S. 471,487-88 (1963 given in what appears to have been a desperate attempt to rebut the confessions. In this sense the testimony caused by the confessions was being used as a substitute for them. Because this practice is such an exploitation of illegality as to be inconsistent with judicial integrity, the Supreme Court's decision appears to be correct. The effects of the case are expressly limited by the Court to the peculiar facts which the case presents," but they will no doubt extend into cases with similar facts. The Court did not base its holding on the kind of police illegality," implying thereby that exclusion based on Mallory will go as far as exclusion based on any other rule. It did give weight to the special prejudicial effects of confessions. 6 However, it is likely that any unlawfully obtained evidence which is so damaging as to cause a conviction if not rebutted will be subject to the same considerations. A more difficult question is presented if there were both lawfully and unlawfully obtained incriminating evidence present when defendant testified, since the prosecution would claim that the evidence came from an independent source. In view of the recognized prejudicial effects of confessions, the courts are likely to exclude any testimony which is a rebuttal of an unlawfully obtained confession, even though there is other evidence on the same point. A harder question is whether all of defendant's testimony might be excluded in such a case. The California cases suggest that it might not be." The key question may be to what extent the prosecution must show that the testimony was not induced by the
